nattuw skrev 2021-07-04 20:09:47 följande:
Jag rekommenderar att du läser boken så att du kan bilda dig en egen uppfattning om dess innehåll och om den tid som boken berör.
Boken du refererar till tar upp Wallenberg, Enskilda banken, SKF - inte de svenska myndigheterna eller svenska staten.
Kort om boken du pushar som att stödja Flam - vilket jag ifrågasätter sanningshalten av.
warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/reviews/aalders.pdf
"This book is the outcome of the authors’ exhaustive investigation of the wartime activity and interests of the Wallenburg brothers, Jacob and Marcus, prominent in Swedish financial circles of the time. Its main focus is on the Stockholm Enskilda Bank (SEB). Aalders and Wiebes argue that SEB played a significant role as an intermediary for private German companies such as Bosch, IG Farben, and Krupp, helping them to conceal and thereby retain ownership of foreign subsidiaries which otherwise would have been liable to confiscation by the Allied powers, and helping the wartime German government both to retain ownership of its foreign assets and to realise the proceeds from sale of assets looted from Germany’s occupied territories, Jewish families, and so on. In addition, the Wallenburg-controlled ball-bearing manufacturer Svenska Kullager Fabriken (SKF) not only played its part in concealing German ownership of foreign subsidiaries across the world, but also supplied the German war economy with large quantities of ball-bearings in the decisive stages of the war."
"The AaldersWiebes methodology is definitely a legal one: the step-by-step accumulation of an overwhelming mass of incriminating evidence both direct and circumstantial. Their criterion for condemnation is also implicitly legal, sometimes “on the balance of probabilities”, sometimes “beyond reasonable doubt”. But a jury of lay readers might wish that the law had been more clearly stated, and the case more succinctly summarised. The authors do not explain the meaning of neutrality, the rights of neutrals in a conflict, or how the rights and obligations of citizens of a neutral country might differ from those of its government. Nor is there much of a summing up, the opportunity for which is diverted into speculation about the fate of Raoul Wallenburg"
"This legalistic approach means that many important questions are not asked. Social scientists (as opposed to jurists) are often professionally more inclined to see behaviour as the test of law, rather than law as the test of behaviour; on this point the documentary evidence may well not suffice, and other kinds of knowledge should be brought to introduced.
At the level of governments and policies one set of questions arises concerning neutrality. How viable was the Swedish concept of neutrality when most other countries were at war? Was neutrality feasible in principle (or, on the other hand, was it the only possible objective)? Was there any way of upholding neutrality other than by doing dirty deals with both sides? If Swedish neutrality was compromised, what criteria are appropriate for us to decide whether it was substantially compromised, on a large scale? At the level of private interests and individuals we need to know more about the motives which drove behaviour and the calculations which directed it. Why did the Wallenburgs act as they did? Was it for the sake of immediate profits, or pro-German or pro-Nazi feeling, or some calculation of the long-run value of their market position in the global economy after a German victory? The relationship to Nazi goals of the German firms’ interests with which the Wallenburgs were involved is also unexamined. Were Krupp and Bosch trying to uphold the long-run overseas financial position of Hitler’s Reich, or were they pursuing their own private strategy regardless of the outcome of the war? How was it that so many in Swedish and Allied governments colluded with the Wallenburgs - was it because of personal friendship, financial self-interest, or shared objectives for restructuring the postwar global economy?"
Handelshögskolan Göteborgs Universitet - mer om SKF och Sverige.
www.econhist.gu.se/digitalAssets/1341/1341645_golson.pdf
"Just over thirty years ago, Scandinavian Economic Historians were absorbed in a lively debate over the extent to which Sweden aided the German war effort. In the most famous of the articles during this period, Alan Milward demonstrated that denying Swedish iron ore to Germany could not have stopped the war;2 eight years later, Martin Fritz’s study of ball bearings concluded that Sweden did not provide sufficient aid to the German war effort to change the course of the war.3 Although this debate ended formally in the late 1970s, many questions were left unanswered. The most puzzling is why so much diplomatic effort was put into policies of the international supply of ball bearings if they seemed so unimportant to post‐war commentators.4 A fresh examination of the ball bearings industry in the Second World War indicates that Swedish‐controlled ball bearings were crucial to both the German and British war effort. Of the two, the Swedish parent company supplied more ball bearings and machine tools to the Germans, enough to significantly affect the outcome of the war. But the Swedish government’s overall wartime activities were more even‐handed than the headline trade statistics might suggest, for example, letting British planes and ships run the blockade from Sweden in 1942. But, although it nominally controlled much of the production of German and British ball bearings, denying either belligerent Swedish‐supplied bearings or machines would merely have slowed the war effort, not ended it. Ball and roller bearings are special"
"In negotiations with the American and British economic warfare offices and representatives of the USCC and UKCC, SKF agreed to severely limit exports to Germany from 13 April until 12 October 1944 for 22 million Kronor in cash. However, the American government also agreed, among other benefits, to compensate SKF the equivalent of 140 million Kronor for bombing VKF in Germany and to unfreeze SKF assets in the US (where it had been blacklisted as an enemy cooperating company).27 The long list of benefits to SKF to stop exporting to Germany makes it look as though access to a neutral’s production goes to the highest bidder, notwithstanding previously agreed trade patterns."
"SKF also had an important effect on the British war effort, providing some 31% of British ball bearings production, including considerable quantities for aero engines. As with Germany, Sweden’s part in the British ball bearings supply chain includes both domestic production and Swedish imports. Although the archives of the British ball bearing control directorate are missing, the UK was dependent on SKF for certain aspects of bearings production."
"Direct wartime imports from Sweden provided about 15% of all British ball bearings. Blockade‐running ships and airplanes were employed to maintain the British imports from Sweden. This trade was an overt choice by the Swedish government to aid the Allied war effort without German consent. It went against the War Trade Agreement process.47 It can even be asserted that these naval and air journeys constituted British military operations launched from Swedish territory. For example, former military officers commanded the boats, while seconded RAF officers piloted the planes. Some carried guns and most used military evasion tactics.48 The illicit nature of the trade, not to mention the use, docking and operation of these ships and airplanes in neutral Sweden, exposes it to the charge of being unduly biased towards the Allied cause, but the same could of course be said about supplying the Germans with bearings above the agreed levels. Whatever the circumstances, these naval and airborne exports from Sweden have not hitherto been reported as part of Swedish wartime trade."
"It should be noted that SKF provided even more substantial discounts to Britain’s ball bearings purchases than Germany’s.73 Table II shows that in 1938, SKF charged the British 74% of the price to Germany for the same material, and by 1943 this figure dropped to 68%. Such discounts off list prices were commercial decisions agreed to as part of the trade negotiations.74 Their rationale remains unclear but it may be argued that it derived from the convertibility of the Pound versus other currencies received. However, SKF set the prices and retained only Kronor earnings so under‐pricing gave them no advantage.75 The discounts could have been an attempt, notable at the time, by SKF to maintain favour and to quash Allied blacklisting and other threats against itself and its British and American subsidiaries.76 Unfortunately, when the SKF archives perished, they probably put the precise reasons for these discounts beyond discovery"
"The statistics show the Swedish bearings industry, specifically SKF, worked more for the German war effort than the Allies’ and settled prices according factors beyond normal business considerations. But it should be remembered the Swedish government violated the established trade rules for both sides, as the over‐supply of Germany and Britain’s blockade‐ running make clear. Moreover, the Americans and British were allowed to pre‐emptively contravene Sweden’s previously agreed and contracted trade terms with Germany. This does not absolve the industry from working more for the Germans than the British, but does demonstrate Sweden’s active role in ensuring access to the industry for both belligerents. "
"But, while Sweden could theoretically have mitigated the losses of the Second World War, it is unclear how it would have been possible to suspend ball bearings and the related exports. Such a suspension would have seemed unreasonable given the Swedish position. Several recent commentaries on neutral European countries in the Second World War have implied that their neutrality should be equated with isolationism,82 but strict isolationism, including suspension of trade, was then impossible for neutrals.83 Sweden depended on imported food and fuel to sustain its population. Suspending ball bearings exports would have led to trade retaliation and probably involved some kind of military action against it. SKF subsidiaries, already harassed because of their neutral affiliation, could have been expropriated by the belligerents. This helps to explain the behaviour of SKF and its government. The policies discussed above were specifically designed to maintain exports to both belligerents. Because they were so difficult to replace, the belligerents’ need for access to Sweden was unappeasable."
